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Abstract
This paper offers an explanation why a principal may demand too
much paperwork from a subordinate: Due to limited liability and
moral hazard a principal is unable to appropriate all rents. Internal
paperwork allows a more accurate monitoring of the agent and en-
ables the principal to appropriate a larger part of the agent’s rent. In
her decision the principal disregards the agent’s cost increase of more
internal paperwork. Consequently, the requested amount of internal
paperwork may be too high from both the agent’s personal point of
view and the organization as a whole.
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21 Introduction
Complaints about too much internal paperwork is a commonly heard criti-
cism in many organizations.1 Not only do members of organizations claim
that the amount of bureaucracy is too high from their own personal point of
view, but also for the organization as a whole. Such claims are clearly puz-
zling. In addition, also organizations dealing with governmental regulation
often characterize the amount of paperwork as counter–productive.2 Out-
siders who are concerned with overall productivity share the criticism. For
instance, a document of the white house on the H.R. 1646 - Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 states ”The Administration
will work with the Congress to eliminate from the bill objectionable provi-
sions, including unproductive reporting requirements and earmarks.”3
This paper explains in a simple principal–agent relationship why a prin-
cipal may, from an overall perspective, demand too much paperwork. The
explanation is driven by the effect of self–reporting on rent sharing between
agent and principal. More specifically we show in an agency model with lim-
ited liability that if internal paperwork leads to a better monitoring of the
agent, it enables the principal to appropriate a larger part of the common
surplus at the agent’s expense. More importantly, the decrease in the agent’s
utility may more than offset the principal’s increase. This we interpret as
excessive reporting.
Effectively, we present the idea that reporting raises the informativeness
of an audit. As a concrete illustration of what we have in mind, consider
an employee who travels on companies business. Not being able to observe
1For instance, the 1999 R&D Magazine/Kelly Scientific Resources Career Satisfaction
Survey reports that almost half of the respondents (48.2%) consider ”too much bureau-
cracy” as the least satisfying aspects of their job. (http://www.kellyservices.com/ksr/
whitepapers/paper6.html)
2E.g., the Mercer County’s ”Agri-Culture:” Study Results reports that ”68.2 percent
of respondents felt that the programs have too much bureaucracy and 52.3 percent felt
that the programs have too much paperwork.” (http://www.swampgoddess.com/ the-
sis4b.html).
3See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/107-1/HR1646-r.html.
3the employee’s behavior during his absence, the employer requires him to
keep a diary. By specifying how often the employee must write an entry
in his diary, the employer determines the reporting intensity. It is thereby
natural that the employee incurs a cost for maintaining the diary and that
this cost is increasing in the required reporting intensity. Once the employee
returns from his travels, the diary contains information about his unobserved
behavior. The amount of information is thereby increasing in the reporting
intensity. However, in order for the employer to obtain this information, she
must actually read and check the diary. This requires time and effort and is
costly to the employer.
Apart from illustrating the setting, the example also demonstrates that
a disclosure of information in practise is more complex than the standard
literature assumes. Although the literature recognizes that disclosure may
be costly (e.g. Townsend (1979)), it abstracts from the fact that it involves
two distinct activities: the generation and the processing of information.
Indeed, in real–life organizations these subactivities are often performed by
different people and are associated with different costs. The current paper
explicitly breaks down the activity of disclosure into these two subactivities.
It thereby interprets the generation of information as the agent writing his
report and the processing of information as the principal’s decision to audit
the agent.
Finally, we want to highlight the difference of our framework to other work
on disclosure and costly state–verification. First, we abstract from a strategic
reporting by the agent. Consequently, the model differs from the literature on
voluntary disclosure or accounting choice (e.g. Watts (1979) and Holthausen
and Leftwich (1983)), where the agent has discretion regarding his accounting
rules. In contrast, we assume that the agent’s reporting activity is verifiable
and contractible. This enables us to concentrate on effort as the agent’s only
source of moral hazard. Second, the principal cannot use the agent’s report to
help her decide whether to audit. In the words of Baiman and Demski (1980),
we consider an unconditional investigation procedure; the principal cannot
condition her auditing decision on the agent’s report.4 Indeed, from this
4Strausz (2004) studies the question of whether a principal would want to use condi-
4perspective the effect of the agent’s report is more mechanic; it directly affects
the accuracy of a potential audit. Third, the model differs from the literature
on window dressing (e.g. Lambert (1984) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2000)).
As Cornelli and Yosha (2003) explain under window dressing the agent’s
(costly) action typically shifts the distribution of an auditing signal to more
favorable realizations rather than increases its precision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
a highly stylized, but tractable model with self–reporting and auditing. This
model is analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 addresses the robustness
of results by illustrating similar effects of reporting in more standard frame-
works with limited liability such as Kim (1997), Park (1994), and Demougin
and Fluet (1998).
2 The Setup
Consider a risk neutral principal who employs a risk neutral agent. The agent
has to decide whether to shirk or work. Shirking costs the agent zero effort,
whereas the agent incurs a cost of e > 0 if he decides to work. A working
agent yields the principal an output yw. From a shirking agent the principal
receives a lower output ys, where ∆y ≡ yw − ys > e. We assume that
both effort and output are non-verifiable and therefore non–contractible.5
The principal may obtain verifiable evidence about the agent’s effort level
if she decides to audit the agent.6 The effectiveness of an audit depends
on the principal’s effort in auditing. For simplicity, the principal chooses
between two effort levels. If the principal audits with a low effort, the audit
is inconclusive, i.e., a low auditing effort effectively means no audit. If, on the
other hand, the principal chooses a high auditing effort, auditing is successful
with probability λ < 1. In this case, it yields hard evidence about the agent’s
true effort level. With probability 1−λ an audit is unsuccessful and no result
tional or unconditional procedures.
5Section 5 addresses verifiable output.
6Since the agent’s effort determines the output deterministically, an alternative inter-
pretation is that an audit makes the output verifiable. This interpretation also motivates
our assumption that output is, initially, non–verifiable.
5obtains. The high auditing effort costs the principal c > 0, while her costs
associated with a low auditing effort are zero. Similar to the agent’s action,
the principal’s auditing effort is unobservable.7 Yet, the auditing outcome
{w, s, n} is observable and verifiable.
The idea of this paper is that internal paperwork increases the precision
of the principal’s auditing technology. To capture this idea, we assume that
at the beginning of their relationship the principal sets the amount of internal
paperwork at some level r ∈ [0, 1].8 The success of the audit, λ, is positively
related to the amount of internal paperwork. That is, the parameter λ is an
increasing function of r with 0 < λ(0) < 1 = λ(1). Paperwork is costly to
the agent. Hence, apart from the cost of effort e, the agent also incurs a cost
of reporting k(r), with k′(r), k′′(r) > 0 and k(1) = ∞. Interpreting r = 0
as no paperwork, we assume k(0) = 0. For simplicity, the principal’s cost of
auditing c are independent of the amount of paperwork. Section 5 addresses
extensions of this framework.
Apart from stipulating the amount of internal paperwork, the agent’s
employment contract specifies the conditional transfers from the principal
to the agent. Since the only verifiable variable is the outcome of the audit,
a general transfer schedule can only be conditioned on the outcome of the
audit and is, consequently, a triple t = (tw, ts, tn). Agent and principal are
risk neutral and the agent is protected by a limited liability level of zero.
That is, a feasible contract t satisfies t ∈ IR3+. Outside options of the two
players are zero.9
3 Optimal Transfers
This section derives, for a given level of internal paperwork r, the optimal
transfers that induce the agent to work. Since this requires incentives, the
7The model therefore falls in the class of auditing models without commitment. E.g.
Melumad and Mookherjee (1989), Jost (1991), Khalil (1997), and Strausz (1997). Section
5 shows that the non–commitment is not crucial.
8I.e., the amount of paperwork is verifiable and contractible
9For simplicity, we let the outside option and the limited liability coincide. This does
not effect qualitative results.
6principal must audit with a positive probability. Hence, the transfer schedule
t should also induce the principal to audit. We first address the principal’s
incentives to audit.
If the principal does not audit, she obtains no evidence and pays the agent
tn. If the principal audits, she receives a successful audit with probability
λ(r). Consequently, when she expects the agent to work she expects to pay
an amount λ(r)tw + (1− λ(r))tn + c. Hence, the transfer schedule t induces
the principal to audit if
tw + c/λ(r) ≤ tn. (1)
If the equation is satisfied in equality, the principal is indifferent concerning
the audit, and any probability of auditing, p, is incentive compatible.10 We
may include this possibility by the additional constraint11
(1− p)(tw + c/λ(r)− tn) = 0. (2)
Given that the principal audits with probability p, the agent receives a
utility pλ(r)tw + (1 − pλ(r))tn − e − k(r) if he works and pλ(r)ts + (1 −
pλ(r))tn − k(r) from shirking. Consequently, the agent works if
pλ(r)(tw − ts)− e ≥ 0. (3)
Finally, the contract must be acceptable to the agent. That is, yield him
more than his outside option of zero. Hence,
pλ(r)tw + (1− pλ(r))tn − e− k(r) ≥ 0. (4)
The constraints (1), (2) and (3) ensure that a transfer schedule t is in-
centive compatible with the principal’s decision to monitor with probability
p and the agent’s decision to work. Hence, a contract t = (tw, ts, tn) is (e, p)-
compatible if the combination (t, p) satisfies (1), (2) and (3). If (t, p) satisfies
in addition the constraint (4), the transfer t is (e, p)-feasible.
10As is well–known, optimal auditing strategies are often random (e.g. Mookherjee and
Png 1989) and must therefore be considered explicitly.
11The condition ensures that when the principal audits with a probability less than one,
the constraint (1) is satisfied in equality, while a strict inequality of (1) implies p = 1.
7The optimal transfers associated with a reporting intensity r is a solution
to the following maximization problem
max
t∈IR3
+
,p∈[0,1]
yw − pλ(r)tw − (1− pλ(r))tn − pc
s.t. (1), (2), (3), (4).
The equilibrium outcome will depend on the efficiency of auditing λ(r).
We, therefore, define
λ¯(r) ≡ (e + c)/(e + k(r) + c);
and define r¯ such that λ(r¯) = λ¯(r¯).12
Proposition 1 Optimal transfers (t∗w, t
∗
s, t
∗
n) exhibit t
∗
s = 0 and t
∗
n = t
∗
w +
c/λ(r). For r < r¯, the optimal contract yields the agent U(r) = (1−λ(r))(e+
c)/λ(r)− k(r) > 0 and the principal V (r) = yw − (e+ c)/λ(r). The principal
monitors with probability p∗ = 1.
For r ≥ r¯, the optimal contract extracts all rents from the agent, i.e.,
U(r) = 0, the principal monitors with a probability p∗ < 1 and receives a
utility V (r), where
p∗ =
(√
4ec/λ(r) + (e + k(r)− c/λ(r))2 + c/λ(r)− e− k(r)
)
/(2c)
and
V (r) = yw −
1
2
(
c/λ(r) + e + k(r) +
√
(c/λ(r)− e− k(r))2 + 4ec/λ(r)
)
.
The proposition shows that for low levels of internal paperwork, (r < r¯),
the agent receives a positive rent. This result is due to limited liability and
is best understood when considering the case r = 0. As k(0) = 0 the agent
incurs no costs if he shirks. Since limited liability implies that all transfers
12Existence of r¯ follows from the continuity of λ(r) and λ¯(r) and the fact that λ(0) <
1 = λ¯(0) and λ(1) = 1 > λ¯(r) for all r > 0. Uniqueness follows because λ(r) is increasing
while λ¯(r) is decreasing in r.
8are non-negative, the agent can guarantee himself a utility of at least zero
by shirking. Hence, since an (e, p)-compatible contract requires that work-
ing yields the agent weakly more than shirking, the contract automatically
satisfies individual rationality. Therefore, the agent’s individual rationality
constraint does not bind at the optimum and the agent receives a rent.
On the other hand, if the required amount of internal paperwork is high,
(r > r¯), the principal appropriates the entire surplus and audits with a prob-
ability less than one. Indeed, for k(r) > 0 a contract that is (e, p)-compatible
is not automatically individual rational to the agent. This implies that the
individual rationality constraint of the agent may bind at the optimum and
this occurs exactly when the auditing technology is efficient.
The proposition moreover shows that the structure of optimal payments is
such that tn > tw > ts. Hence, the agent receives the largest payment, when
there is neither evidence that the agent worked nor shirked. This feature is
typical of costly verification models in which the principal cannot commit to
verify.13 In this case, the larger payment is needed to induce the principal
to monitor. The fact that tw > ts is standard and represents the required
incentives to induce the agent to work.
4 Optimal Reporting and Effort
The previous section derived the optimal transfers for a given level of internal
paperwork r. Proposition 1 showed that for r < r¯ the principal’s utility is
V (r) = yw − (e + c)/λ(r) and since λ is increasing r, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 2 If the principal induces the agent to work, she optimally
chooses a standard r∗ ≥ r¯. The principal’s choice r∗ exceeds the level r∗∗ = 0
which is optimal from the perspective of aggregate utility.
The first result follows because for r < r¯ the principal’s utility does,
in equilibrium, not depend on the agent’s personal cost of reporting k(r).
13See for example Khalil (1997) and Strausz (1997).
9Indeed, when the principal considers a marginal increase of the agent’s re-
porting requirement r, there are two effects. First, the increase makes the
principal’s monitoring technology more efficient. Second, the agent incurs an
additional cost of k′(r). Yet, since for r < r¯ the agent receives a rent, the
principal does not have to compensate the agent for his increased cost k ′(r).
Hence, from the principal’s point of view a raise in r from a level below r¯ has
only the beneficial effect of making monitoring more efficient and enables the
principal to reduce the agent’s rent. The rent extraction has the perverse
effect that the agent’s loss in utility outweighs the principal’s gain so that
aggregate utility declines.
To conclude this section we address whether the principal actually wants
the agent to work. She does so, if her payoff from a working agent is higher
than from a shirking one. Since a shirking agent yields the principal ys and
a working agent yields the principal at least yw − (e + c)/λ(r¯), we arrive at
the following sufficient condition.
Corollary 1 It is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to work if
∆y ≥ (e + c)/λ(r¯).
Due to the presence of rents, the principal does not make decisions that
maximize aggregate utility. Proposition 2 shows that this leads to excessive
reporting. Yet, the presence of rents may also affect the principal’s decision
concerning the agent’s effort level. In particular, if the minimum rent that is
needed to induce the agent to work is too high, the principal prefers the agent
to shirk even though aggregate payoffs may be larger under working. But
since excess reporting leads to a reduction in rents, it may make it actually
worthwhile for the principal to induce the agent to work. This argument
indicates that excess reporting may have the beneficial effect that it reduces
effort distortion. Indeed, let the function
∆y(r) ≡ (e + c)/λ(r),
represent, for a given intensity r, the difference yw − ys for which the prin-
cipal is indifferent between inducing the agent to work or shirk. Since
10
λ(r) is increasing in r, it holds that ∆y(0) > ∆y(r¯). Hence, whenever
∆y ∈ (∆y(r¯), ∆y(0)) it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to
work under her optimal reporting standard r∗, but making the agent work
would not be optimal under the aggregate utility maximizing paperwork level
r = 0.
Consequently, if the principal’s reporting requirement affects her decision
which effort level to induce, the question what to consider excessive report-
ing becomes more subtle. The source of this subtlety is that the principal
effectively takes two decisions: the reporting standard r and the induced ef-
fort level e. Due to the moral hazard problem, both these decisions may be
distorted and the corollary shows that the two distortions may affect each
other. If ∆y > ∆y(0) this complication does not arise and the principal’s re-
porting requirement is unambiguously excessive. However, for ∆y < ∆y(0),
a higher reporting requirement may have the beneficial effect that it reduces
the principal’s effort distortion. This positive effect offsets the principal’s
high reporting requirement.
5 A More Standard Model
In the previous sections we used an extremely stylized model to demonstrate
our argument that, when reporting facilitates verification, concerns about the
distribution of rents may lead to excessive reporting. The simple structure
kept the model tractable so that we were able to solve it explicitly. In this
section we want to argue that the main insight is general and robust. For this
we introduce reporting and auditing in the risk–neutral agency framework
with limited liability as analyzed in, for example, Park (1994), Demougin
and Fluet (1998), and Kim (1997).
Hence, consider an agency setting in which a risk neutral agent is pro-
tected by a liability of zero. The agent has to choose some unobservable
effort e from a continuous interval [el, eh] with costs c(e). As is standard,
the agent’s effort e thereby determines the output x ∈ X according to the
distribution function q(e). The output accrues to a risk neutral principal. In
addition to choosing an effort level, the agent reports to the principal with
11
some intensity r. The agent thereby incurs a personal cost of ka(r). We
assume that the function ka(.) is increasing and convex. To induce the agent
to work, the principal must audit the agent with some intensity a ∈ [al, ah].
She thereby incurs a cost kp(a, r) > 0.
In order to induce the agent to work, the principal may write an incentive
contract t which conditions on all available, verifiable information. This
verifiable information consists of the output x and a signal s ∈ S from the
principal’s auditing process. The signal s is stochastic and its distribution
depends on the agent’s effort level e, the agent’s reporting intensity r, and
the principal’s auditing intensity a. Consequently, our model falls, for a fixed
pair (r, a), in the class of problems analyzed by Demougin and Fluet (1998).
These authors demonstrate that, in this type of models, the agency cost is
equivalent to the agent’s rent and that if the information system is relatively
inaccurate or the level of limited liability is relative high then this rent is
strictly positive.14 Consequently, a superior information system is one which
reduces the agent’s minimum rent that is required to implement some effort
level e > el.
To make this more concrete, let R(e|a, r) represent the minimum rent
which the principal must leave to the agent if she wants to induce an effort
level e > el. Then our idea that reporting and auditing improves the princi-
pal’s information is equivalent to saying that R is decreasing in a and r. In
particular, ∂R/∂r < 0.
From the principal’s perspective the cost of implementing an effort level
e > el depends on her personal auditing costs and the total transfer to the
agent. Per definition, the total transfer to the agent is his total costs plus
the rent, i.e., ka(r) + c(e) + R(e|a, r). That is, the cost to the principal of
implementing an effort level e is
Cp(r|e, a) = kp(a, r) + ka(r) + c(e) + R(e|a, r).
Thus, for a given effort level e and auditing level a, the principal chooses a
reporting intensity r∗p(e, a) that minimizes her costs Cp(r|e, a). Yet, from a
14This is a general feature of agency models with risk neutrality and limited liability.
See also Kim (1997) and Park (1994).
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perspective of the organization as a whole costs are
Co(r|e, a) = kp(a, r) + ka(r) + c(e).
Due to ∂R/∂r < 0 it follows C ′p(r|e, a) < C
′
o(r|e, a). That is, a marginal
increase in the reporting intensity r raises the principal’s costs less than
the costs of the organization as a whole. This indicates that the principal’s
incentives regarding reporting are excessive. In particular, if we let
r∗o(e, a) ≡ minr Co(r|e, a)
denote the optimal reporting intensity from an overall perspective and as-
sume internal solutions, then from comparing first order conditions, it follows
r∗p(e, a) > r
∗
o(e, a) > 0.
15 Thus, the principal’s demands a higher reporting
intensity than would be optimal from the perspective of the organization as
a whole. This constitutes excessive reporting.
Until now we examined the role of reporting in a framework where the
agent is risk neutral. We want to conclude this section by arguing that,
also in an environment where the agent is risk averse, the principal’s concern
about rents lead to excessive reporting.
Holmstro¨m (1979) and Shavell (1979) show that when the agent is risk
averse, the agent can only be given incentives when he incurs risk. Hence, if
the risk–averse agent is protected by limited liability, the agency cost consists
of two components: the agent’s rent and a compensation for the imposed
risk. Kim (1995) and Jewitt (1997) show that a superior information system
enables the principal to provide stronger incentives while imposing less risk
on the agent. This implies that when reporting increases the precision of the
auditing signal, it lowers both types of agency costs. As before, the principal
will be concerned with appropriating the agent’s rent, whereas the division
of rents is immaterial from a perspective of the organization as a whole.
Since reporting reduces the rent, the principal’s incentives are therefore too
15Internal solutions arise when the cost function kp(a, r) is U–shaped in r, where a U–
shaped kp(a, r) captures the idea that some initial level of reporting facilitates but more
intense reporting complicates auditing.
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strong. Thus, in a risk–averse framework we may expect excessive reporting
for similar reasons. A new aspect is that reporting has an additional value; it
reduces the amount of risk that is needed to provide incentives. As a result, a
strictly positive level of reporting may also be desirable for the organization
as a whole. Yet, the principal will incorporate this effect as well. On top
of this, however, she also considers the effect of reporting on the rent. This
induces her to require more reporting than is desirable from the perspective
of the organization as a whole.
6 Conclusion
This papers explains why a superior (the principal) may demand too much
reporting from its subordinates (the agent). Effectively, the explanation de-
pends on the dual role of reporting. On the one hand, it affect costs and
therefore the size of the surplus between the agent and principal. On the
other hand, reporting allows the principal to appropriate a larger part of the
surplus. The paper showed that the second effect may outweigh the first.
This we interpret as excessive reporting.
Our explanation of excessive reporting requires that, in the absence of
reporting, a principal leaves rents to the agent. In our model this charac-
teristic obtains due to a limited liability on the agent’s side. Yet, similar
results may be expected in a model in which principal and agent share the
surplus according to some bargaining rule and the level of reporting affects
the parties’ threat-points or outside options. Also in this case reporting plays
the aforementioned dual role: it determines the size of the surplus and its
division. We have chosen to illustrate our results in a simple model with
limited liability in which the agent’s rent is obtained endogenously rather
than imposed by an ad-hoc bargaining rule.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
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The transfer ts influences only the incentive constraint of the agent, (3). Since
a lower ts relaxes this constraint, it is optimal to set ts as low as possible,
i.e., ts = 0. Next note that one may assume without loss of generality that
(1) is binding at the optimal such that t∗n = t
∗
w + c/λ(r). For suppose not,
then necessarily p∗ = 1 and δ ≡ tn− tw − c/λ(r) > 0. Increasing tw by δ and
reducing tn by δpλ(r)/(1− pλ(r)) yields a contract for which (1) is binding.
This contract yields the principal the same utility and remains to satisfy (3),
(4) and the limited liability constraints. Hence, it must also be optimal.
By substitution we may therefore reduce the problem to
max
tw,p
yw − tw − c/λ(r)
tw ≥
e
pλ(r)
(5)
tw ≥ e + k(r)− (1− pλ(r))c/λ(r). (6)
The objective function is decreasing in tw and independent of p. There-
fore, (5) or (6) is binding at the optimum. The right hand side of (5) is
decreasing, while the right hand side of (6) is increasing in p. Hence, if
for p = 1 the r.h.s. of (5) is larger than the r.h.s. of (6), then at the
optimum (5) binds and p∗ = 1. That is, if λ(r)(e + k(r) + c) < (e + c),
then the optimal contract exhibits p∗ = 1 and t∗w = e/λ(r). The princi-
pal’s utility is Vr = yw − (e + c)/λ(r), while the agent receives the utility
Ur = (1− λ(r))(e + c)/λ(r)− k(r) > 0.
For λ(r)(e+k(r)+ c) > (e+ c), the optimal p is less than one and chosen
such that tw can be set as small as possible. Therefore, p
∗ = arg minp max{e/(pλ(r)), e+
k(r)−(1−pλ(r))c/λ(r)} and the optimal p is such that the r.h.s of (5) equals
the r.h.s. of (6). It follows
p∗ =
(√
4ec/λ(r) + (e + k(r)− c/λ(r))2 + c/λ(r)− e− k(r)
)
/(2c)
and t∗w = e/(p
∗λ(r)). With substitution and a rearrangement of terms the
principal’s utility is
Vr = yw −
1
2
(
c/λ(r) + e + k(r) +
√
(c/λ(r)− e− k(r))2 + 4ec/λ(r)
)
.
and the agent’s utility is zero. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
First part of the statement follows directly from the observation that for
r < r¯ the principal’s utility is V (r) = yw − (e + c)/λ(r) is increasing r.
For the second statement first note that for r < r¯ aggregate utility V (r)+
U(r) = yw−e−c−k(r). According to Proposition 1 optimal transfers satisfy
t∗s = 0 and t
∗
n = t
∗
w+c/λ(r) and substitution yields V (r) = yw−t
∗
w(r)−c/λ(r).
For r > r¯ it holds U(r) = 0 such that aggregate utility coincides with the
principal utility V (r) = yw− t
∗
w(r)− c/λ(r). The agent’s incentive constraint
(3) implies that tw ≥ e/(pλ(r)). V (r) = yw−t
∗
w(r)−c/λ(r) < yw−e/(pλ(r))−
c/λ(r) < yw − e − c. It follows that overall utility is maximized for r = 0.
Q.E.D.
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